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3Executive Summary
The SAFIR2018 Research Program on Nuclear Power Plant Safety (2015–2018) is the 
most recent in a series of four-year programs funded through the Finnish Nuclear 
Energy Act to ensure that, should new matters related to the safe use of nuclear 
power plants arise, the authorities possess sufficient technical expertise and other 
competence required for rapidly determining the significance of the matters.  
Each SAFIR program is evaluated during its fourth year. The objectives of the 
SAFIR2018 evaluation are: 
1. to examine the results of the program and how those results have added value to 
end users (power companies and regulator) and how they have created external 
awareness in the international scientific community; 
2. to assess how well the expertise of the SAFIR2018 program covers necessary 
fields of study and how well it develops new experts; 
3. to determine how successfully the recommendations made following the 
SAFIR2014 evaluation have been implemented and whether these changes have 
had the desired impact; and 
4. to identify challenges and make recommendations.  
The evaluation team prepared for its evaluation by reading extensive documen-
tation about the SAFIR program and then visiting Finland for five days from 28 
January to 2 February 2018. The team met with representatives from all the key 
stakeholder groups, including the ministry, regulator, researchers, and power com-
panies.  The team heard presentations from all research projects and met with chairs 
or co-chairs of each Steering Group and Reference Group. The team toured facilities 
at the Technical Research Center of Finland ( VTT) and Lappeenranta University of 
Technology (LUT). 
4Results of SAFIR2018 and 
Development of Expertise
Overall, our evaluation of the scientific and technical quality of the program is very good.  
Individual research projects are producing results that range from good to very good.  End users 
and stakeholders in general are pleased with the program, although some mention opportu-
nities for improvement.  Engagement of the power companies and regulator is good and their 
participation facilitates the relevance and success of the research program.  The infrastructure 
projects are coming to fruition and are an important investment in future capabilities. 
The capabilities supported by the SAFIR2018 program are strong for a country of Finland’s 
size, as demonstrated by the significant numbers of graduate theses, conference presentations, 
scholarly publications, and extensive international cooperation.  These capabilities reside in 
knowledge documented in reports and publications, physical infrastructure of laboratories, 
tools, and models (both physical and computer-based), and most importantly in people whose 
expertise prepares them to deal with both expected and unexpected developments.  We met 
many young researchers presenting their work who are articulate, energetic, and excited about 
their research projects and career opportunities. 
SAFIR2014 Implementation
The SAFIR2014 report made many specific and general recommendations, among which we 
focused on five areas that we judged to be of particular importance: (1) strategic top-down 
steering, (2) funding for research infrastructure, (3) generating new expertise, (4) introducing 
new projects, and (5) cross-disciplinary connections.
Significant efforts were made to address each of the five areas, with more success in some 
areas than in others.  Most successful has been the funding for and building of infrastructure 
including the RADLAB facility at VTT and the thermal-hydraulics laboratories at LUT.  These 
two facilities now provide support for reactor and structural safety research, although it is not 
yet clear how these facilities will be used.  The generation of new expertise has also been very 
successful, as shown in published research and other research reports, graduate students who 
worked on SAFIR projects, career paths of young researchers and engineers trained in the 
SAFIR program and networks of collaborative relationships within Finland and with Nordic, 
European, and global counterparts.  
5It has proved more difficult to provide strategic top-down steering, to introduce new pro-
jects, and to stimulated cross-disciplinary connections.  Following the SAFIR2014 report, 
SAFIR2018 was reorganized into a partially-matrixed structure with three Steering Groups 
and six Reference Groups.  But this has not resulted in a fully shared and articulated strategic 
vision, understanding of the diversity of stakeholders needs, or strong stakeholder ownership 
of the main research areas. The Steering Group structure is operating primarily as a project 
monitoring process. The Reference Groups are quite diverse and function differently from 
one another. Different stakeholders hold somewhat different expectations for the immediate 
future and the projects to be carried out. For example, it is natural that power companies want 
research results that can improve operations in the near term, whereas building capabilities 
for an uncertain future involves balancing many diverse needs, near term and long term, 
well-known and imagined.  Although there are some cross-project interactions and connec-
tions, the Reference Groups have not built systematic cross-disciplinary interactions. We also 
believe that more opportunity and support is needed for new proposals and new ideas, despite 
the limited budget.  It is natural that established research teams with proven productivity are 
in a good position to receive continued funding for the same or related projects.  The proper 
balance may also differ between the research areas. The small fund (50K Euros each year) used 
to selectively fund new projects is a modest step in this direction.  
Challenges
Consistent with the SAFIR2014 evaluation report, we identify continuing challenges arising 
from an ambitious and diverse research program serving multiple stakeholder needs with 
limited resources.  SAFIR2018 is simultaneously organizing projects to achieve scientific 
research goals and also add value to end users, train the next generation of experts, capitalize 
on synergies across projects, support existing projects while encouraging new and disruptive 
ideas, minimize administrative burden, and stay within budget.  
Recommendations
Beyond making observations and recommendations about individual projects, we believe the 
most important recommendations are about the organization of the SAFIR program as a whole:
1. Develop a Strategic Roadmap
More can be done to provide a strategic view of the SAFIR research portfolio and additional 
top-down “steering” of priorities. We believe it is important to bring together both stake-
holder representatives and the best information available about scenarios for the future of 
nuclear power in Finland.  This can help define the breadth and depth of expertise needed 
within the country, what is available currently in terms of scientific knowledge, tools, and 
6infrastructures and what is in the pipeline of research projects and human resources (e.g., 
students). The roadmap can be used to facilitate strategic conversations as part of the stand-
ard process of evaluating projects and programs, planning new programs and generating 
proposals, structuring the governance and organization of programs, building communities 
of researchers, and modifying the roadmap as the nuclear power industry evolves. 
2. Consider Flexible Funding to Support Diverse Projects and More New Initiatives 
We believe that the current funding process with annual renewals for all projects and an expec-
tation of four years of funding is not suitable for all projects and is not encouraging of novel 
exploratory projects in particular.  The annual renewal process creates paperwork require-
ments for annual assessments and proposals, and is inconsistent with projects that need 
guarantees of longer funding that coordinate with EURATOM or other multi-year funding 
sources.  Instead, there could be a flexible funding cycle in which most projects would have four 
years of base funding but other projects could have fewer years of funding.  Further, new pro-
jects and new research teams could be encouraged by having a separate proposal category and 
budget for development of new ideas.  For example, 20% of the annual funding could be availa-
ble for new proposals, innovative and disruptive ideas, and cross-discipline projects. Typically, 
such projects could start with a shorter funding cycle.  These projects could have their own 
Reference Group to provide advice, organize workshops and other developmental activities.  
When new projects mature, they could be moved into a different Reference Group that would 
provide a good community, and continuation proposals could be for longer periods. 
3. Consider Flexible Organizing to Build a Vibrant Research Community
Cross-project interaction is happening to some extent, but not as much as hoped. 
Reference Group heads could be given more encouragement to promote interactions 
among projects in different ways.  Various kinds of workshops, conferences, and discus-
sions with end users could encourage interactions across projects and among various 
stakeholders. Newsletters and blogs could help keep projects aware of progress and oppor-
tunities for synergy.  Perhaps the SAFIR2018 project manager could develop a simplified 
project management process that would leave more time for the Steering Groups to discuss 
strategic issues and the Reference Groups to have meaningful research conversations.  
4. Develop Ways to Assess Impact
It is not obvious how to assess whether the results of SAFIR programs are succeeding in 
the long term, although it is possible to assess short-term results by examining papers 
published, reports issued, conferences attended, and degrees conferred. With a stronger 
roadmap, as recommended above, it would be possible to compare SAFIR results against 
strategic needs. We believe there are other indicators of SAFIR success and impact, 
including examining the career paths of SAFIR researchers and their impact on research, 
7implementation, and policy, and examining the networks of co-authorship and profes-
sional relationships that constitute the “invisible college” of research communities.
5. Think of Organizational Change as a Collaborative Opportunity
In contrast to technical recommendations where solutions are available, expertise is 
acknowledged, and the difficulties are mostly around complexity and resources, organiza-
tional recommendations (such as new roles for Reference Group leaders) are more difficult 
because solutions have to be invented, expertise is less available or recognizable, people 
have to change their responsibilities, behaviors and beliefs, and stakeholders must find 
ways to achieve diverse interests that sometimes seem to be in conflict.  Successful change 
requires stakeholders to open new conversations and work together to find effective paths 
forward on their collaborative journey and commit to collective goals and actions.  
Conclusions
The SAFIR2018 program is strong.  Results contribute knowledge and expertise needed for 
the Finnish regulator, universities, research organizations and power companies to assess new 
challenges to nuclear safety.  New infrastructure provides essential capabilities.  Stakeholders 
are engaged and generally pleased with the value they receive.  The next generation of nuclear 
safety researchers is emerging and contributing to the pool of expertise.  Finland has an excel-
lent international reputation and a strong network of communication and cooperation with 
Nordic, European, and global counterparts.
However, there remain significant challenges and opportunities for improvement. Like vir-
tually all organizations, the SAFIR program faces challenges of leveraging limited resources, 
attending to multiple stakeholders with diverse interests, balancing stability and deepening 
of existing capabilities with openness to new and disruptive ideas, managing cross-discipli-
nary connections to derive synergies from individual projects, and minimizing administrative 
burden. Any improvements, no matter how well designed, will succeed only if stakeholders 
work together to secure the future of nuclear safety research in Finland.  
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81 Introduction
1.1 The SAFIR Program
Finland embarked on its nuclear power program several decades ago, and since that time has 
made a sustained national effort to maintain nuclear power as an important component of 
electricity production; nuclear power currently contributes approximately 30% of electricity 
generation in Finland.  The government and nuclear power industry have wisely recognized 
that maintenance and growth of nuclear power requires education and research capabilities 
to provide expertise for operations now and in the future.  It is also essential that the Finnish 
nuclear industry can participate in international networks (i.e., Nordic, European, global) of 
experts who are sharing new technologies, best practices, and advance warnings of emerging 
problems.  Accordingly, Chapter 7a, Section 53a of the Finnish Nuclear Energy Act is intended 
to ensure that, should new matters related to the safe use of nuclear power plants arise, the 
authorities possess sufficient technical expertise and other competence required for rapidly 
determining the significance of the matters.  
The Finnish Ministry of Employment and Economy (MEAE) is tasked with meeting this need 
for expertise.  The Nuclear Energy Act of 2003 provided funding primarily through fees col-
lected from nuclear power companies and began the first of a series of four-year nuclear safety 
research programs, SAFIR (2003-2006). (Research groups on nuclear safety had formed in 
the 1960s and national nuclear safety research programs have existed since the early 1990s.)  
Research projects must be of high scientific quality and results must be available for publication 
and not restricted in use to a single license holder.  Each SAFIR program is evaluated during its 
fourth year. The current SAFIR2018 (2015-2018) program is the subject of this evaluation.
The SAFIR2018 program planning group defined the following mission statement 
in 2014 at the start of SAFIR2018:
National nuclear safety research develops and creates expertise, experimental facilities 
as well as computational and assessment methods for solving future safety issues.
Further articulating the mission statement was a vision of a successful SAFIR2018:
The SAFIR2018 research community is a vigilant, internationally recognized and 
strongly networked competence pool that carries out research on topics relevant to the 
safety of Finnish nuclear power plants on a high scientific level and with modern methods 
and experimental facilities.
9Competence resides primarily in people, but also in infrastructure such as laboratories and 
computational software, educational and training organizations, national and international 
networks of cooperation, and government and industry more broadly.  Hence, competence 
refers to being able to assemble the necessary expertise to deal with unforeseen problems, 
which depends on both the production and maintenance of expertise, and the structures that 
enable that expertise to be utilized in a timely way.
1.2  The SAFIR2018 Evaluation Process
Every four years the SAFIR program is evaluated by a team of experts with the knowledge, experi-
ence, and independence to understand the program and suggest improvements.  The SAFIR2014 
evaluation team made a variety of observations and recommendations, and the SAFIR2018 
program responded by changing the content of research and the governance structure of projects.
The objectives of the SAFIR2018 evaluation are: 
1. to examine the results of the program and how those results have added value to end users 
(power companies and regulator) and how they have created external awareness in the 
international scientific community; 
2. to assess how well the expertise of the SAFIR2018 program covers necessary fields of study 
and how well it develops new experts; 
3. to determine how successfully the SAFIR2014 recommendations have been implemented 
and whether these changes have had the desired impact; and 
4. to identify challenges and make recommendations.  
The evaluation team was commissioned by MEAE and was comprised of:  
1. John S. Carroll (Chair), Gordon Kaufman Professor of Management, MIT Sloan School of 
Management; 
2. Xu Cheng, Professor at Karlsruhe Institute of Technology and Director of the Division of 
Innovative Nuclear Systems; 
3. Jacques Giovanola, Emeritus Professor Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne (EPFL) 
and Member of the Board, Swiss Federal Nuclear Safety Inspectorate; and 
4. Timo Okkonen, consultant at Reqris Oy, with extensive experience in the nuclear power 
industry.  
The team collectively has over 100 years of experience in the nuclear power industry as 
researchers, educators, consultants, program and institute directors, designers and inspectors. 
Notably, the team has extensive technical expertise in topics within the SAFIR2018 portfolio 
and significant research program management expertise.  
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The team prepared for its evaluation by reading extensive documentation about the 
SAFIR2018 program (see Appendix A), and then visited Finland from 29 January to 2 
February.  The team met with representatives from all the key stakeholder groups, including 
the ministry, regulator, researchers, and power companies (see Appendix B).  We heard pres-
entations from all research projects.  We met with chairs or co-chairs of each Steering Group 
and Reference Group (see descriptions of these groups later).  The team toured facilities at 
the Technical Research Center of Finland (VTT) and Lappeenranta University of Technology 
(LUT).  A short summary of key points was discussed with members of the Managing Board 
toward the end of the visit.  A presentation of key observations and opportunities was deliv-
ered to stakeholders and discussed on the last day of the visit.
In the remainder of this report we first briefly describe the overall SAFIR2018 program and 
portfolio of projects, and the process by which projects are requested, evaluated, funded, and 
managed.  We then examine the individual projects, including the results of the program in 
terms of value added to stakeholders and the development of expertise (the first two objectives 
above).  We next describe the recommendations of the SAFIR2014 Evaluation and how suc-
cessfully those recommendations have been implemented.  Finally, we discuss the challenges 
facing SAFIR and what we believe would be useful opportunities going forward, both in terms 
of the content of SAFIR research and the way that the program operates, including the roles of 
key stakeholders.
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2  The SAFIR2018 Program
Governance of SAFIR programs is vested in MEAE, which appoints a Managing Board (MB) 
chaired by a senior manager from the Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK) and 
including representatives of the ministry, power companies, national laboratory (VTT), uni-
versities with nuclear engineering programs (Aalto University and LUT), the Finnish Funding 
Agency for Innovation (Tekes) and the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority (SSM).  The MB is 
responsible for the overall content and planning of the research program.  
Each year the MB issues a public call for research proposals, designed around the SAFIR four-
year plan and input from stakeholders. Planning of research, evaluation of research proposals, 
and project management of results and costs take place in Steering Groups (SGs) comprised 
of representatives from the end users (STUK, power companies), and which report to the 
MB.  Steering Groups are listed in Table 1 and described more fully below.  Budgets are deter-
mined annually and all projects must reapply for funding each year, although in practice many 
research teams receive continuing funds within the four-year SAFIR program and even longer. 
Projects are also grouped thematically under Reference Groups (RGs, also in Table 1) with rep-
resentatives from both end users and technical support organizations (VTT, Aalto, LUT).  The 
RGs provide opportunities for scientific discussion among project managers (from the tech-
nical support organizations) and end users.  The structure of SGs and RGs arose following the 
SAFIR2014 Evaluation as a reorganization of nine Research Groups in SAFIR2014, intended 
to encourage more cross-discipline interaction and strategic thinking and to improve adminis-
trative work efficiency. 
Additionally, the Nuclear Energy Act was amended to collect funds for the enhancement of 
infrastructure during 2015-2025, providing new facilities at VTT (hot cells) and LUT (ther-
mal-hydraulics laboratory) and funding for Finnish participation in the European Jules 
Horowitz Reactor project, located in France.  For 2018, the SAFIR program has an annual 
budget of approximately 11.2M Euros, of which 4.5M Euros is for infrastructure development.
There are 30 projects currently funded in SAFIR2018, of which 1 is an administrative project 
that was not evaluated in this report.  The remaining 29 projects are grouped into 3 SGs and 
6 RGs (see Table 1).  We organize our presentations by discussing each of the 3 SGs, which 
include five of the six RGs, and then discuss RG6, which is not associated with an SG:
1. SG1 is Plant Safety and Systems Engineering, which includes 7 projects, 4 of which are in 
RG1 (Automation, Organization and Human Factors) and the remaining 3 in RG2 (Severe 
Accidents and Risk Analysis); 
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2. SG2 is Reactor Safety, which includes 11 projects, 2 of which are in RG2, 5 in RG3 (Reactors 
and Fuel), and 4 in RG4 (Thermal Hydraulics); and 
3.  SG3 is Structural Safety and Materials, which includes 8 projects, 2 of which are in RG2 
and the remaining 6 in RG5 (Structural Integrity).  
4.  RG6 (Research Infrastructure) has 3 projects without an SG.   
Examining the intersections between SGs and RGs (see Table 1), it can be seen that RG1 pro-
jects are entirely within SG1, RG3 and RG4 projects are entirely within SG2, RG5 projects are 
entirely within SG3, and RG6 is by itself, whereas RG2 projects are divided up among SG1, 
SG2, and SG3.  Altogether, the eight groupings in Table 1 resemble the nine Research Groups 
from SAFIR2014.  We will discuss the effectiveness of the organization of SGs and RGs in later 
sections of the report.  We now present our descriptions and analyses of projects organized by 
SGs (including RG6 by itself ).  
2.1  Steering Group 1 Plant Safety and Systems 
Engineering 
The seven projects in SG1 include a wide range of topics within the general area of “plant safety 
and systems engineering.”  Four of the projects comprise all of RG1 Automation, Organization 
and Human Factors and the remaining three are part of RG2 Severe Accidents and Risk 
Analysis; RG2 includes other projects in SG2 and SG3 (see Fig 1).  Not only are projects diverse 
across RG1 and RG2, but those within an RG are quite distinct, and even the work within a 
single project can involve work packages that are essentially separate projects.  Overall, we 
identified three groupings among the seven projects: (1) human and organizational behavior, 
(2) risk analysis of specific hazards, and (3) broad issues of risk analysis.
2.1.1  Human and Organizational Behavior
Two projects, both in RG1, examine human and organizational behavior:  CORE and MAPS.  
CORE focuses on operator resilience in challenging operations situations, such as multitasking, 
troubleshooting, coping with stress, and communicating in emergency situations.  CORE has 
a comprehensive approach with work packages focused on prevention, preparation, and mit-
igation of consequence management.  The goal is to support operating personnel who need to 
have an in-depth understanding of plant systems in order to maintain safety, and capabilities for 
flexibility, adaptability, learning from operating experience and self-reflection.  CORE is there-
fore focused on the competence of operators in highly-regulated and automated work contexts, 
rather than on the competence of researchers, regulators, or other industry experts.  Much of the 
CORE approach relies on classic applications of human factors to operator behavior, however, 
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the project also investigates newer topics such as self-reflection as a means to increase operator 
resilience.  
CORE results are embodied in training materials and interventions, operational guidelines, 
human factors tools for anticipating problems, models and simulations. There is a good stream 
of papers and publications, as well as graduate theses. It is important to think about assessing 
the impact on operations beyond operator ratings of training experiences.  Although operator 
guidance may be developed and embedded in policies and training, assessing the impact of that 
guidance on operator resilience is still a challenge.  Has operator behavior actually changed, 
with demonstrable and positive results?  Such an assessment could involve simulator activi-
ties, table top exercises, control room observations, and analyses of incident reports (focusing 
on mitigation and recovery as well as prevention and preparation).  This is a challenge for the 
global human factors community, and Finland is well-positioned to contribute to this effort, 
and possibly play a leading role.  Further, although CORE seeks a comprehensive approach 
that includes individual, work design, team, and organizational factors, the work packages 
are mostly designed around the individual, consistent with the heritage of the human factors 
field (with some exceptions, such as the goal to study distributed work teams).  For example, 
prevention of work stress is accomplished by training operators to be fluent multitaskers, not 
by examining staffing levels and work organization, or by looking at interactions across opera-
tions, maintenance, engineering design, training, and management.
MAPS has an even broader set of work packages including management of complex projects 
involving multiple contracting organizations and multiple national cultures, understanding cul-
tural phenomena and impacts on safety culture, and developing tools and guidance for project 
management and safety culture.  Managing complex projects involving multiple contractors and 
sub-contractors, with supply chains often crossing national borders with varying legal and cul-
tural expectations, has emerged as an important topic in many safety-critical industries, including 
nuclear power, oil and gas, and aviation.  MAPS work packages represent an interesting set of 
ideas about safety culture and bits and pieces of projects, such as project alliancing and safety 
culture ambassadors, but it is challenging to bring these together in an integrated approach.  
MAPS is producing papers, publications, and graduates, but has the greater challenge of being in 
a less developed and more diffuse field.  Both CORE and MAPS include topics such as communi-
cation, decision making, problem solving, and learning, and they sought to conduct a joint workshop 
and to cooperate on a joint paper, although we have not seen the results of these collaborative efforts.  
These projects raise the strategic question of whether they belong in the portfolio of SAFIR2018 
projects, because they represent areas of expertise that are less well-developed world-wide, less 
evident in Finland, and less obviously “nuclear.” Although the human factors field has focused on 
man-machine interactions for many decades and more recently has expanded its focus to teams 
and organizations, organizational culture and safety culture in particular are a relatively new and 
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contested field. Further, while recognizing that there has been a human factors group at VTT for 
30 years, this group, to our knowledge, has not focused on organizational and safety culture. 
Nevertheless, we believe further discussion of the priority for these areas of competence is 
warranted. These are areas of considerable value in safety management, as evidenced by the 
importance placed upon them by organizations in the nuclear power industry such as IAEA 
and WANO.  Both projects have sought to develop expertise, in part, by reaching out beyond 
the nuclear power industry: CORE collaborates with the Finnish Institute of Occupational 
Health and MAPS has been benchmarking the Norwegian oil and gas industry.  Discussion 
should include additional ways to support development of competence (particularly acute for 
the MAPS team), such as an additional university professorship, visiting scholars, support for 
scientific conferences, and/or an advisory board of experts.
2.1.2  Risk Analysis of Specific Hazards
Three projects analyze risks of specific hazards: SAUNA (RG1), ESSI (RG1), and EXWE (RG2).  
SAUNA looks at the expansion of digital automation in nuclear power plants, particularly in 
instrumentation and controls.  It is developing analytical tools and model checking approaches 
to make the safety case around new information architectures and defense in depth.  There are 
many topics being covered.  Some of the work relates to culture and the MAPS projects, and 
work on PRA links to the PRAMEA project.  
ESSI is a new project initiated after the Fukushima accident.  ESSI examines accident 
scenarios involving common cause open phase electrical faults, lightning strikes, and the 
requirements of adaptive operation (load following).  The goal is to identify risks through 
modeling and simulation as well as surveys of plant preparedness, and subsequently to specify 
requirements to ensure safety.  There is some overlap with CORE in studying operator behav-
ior of noticing and reacting to problems.  
EXWE has an analogous goal around meteorological modeling of extreme wind and sea level 
conditions that could threaten nuclear plant safety, another topic that received additional 
attention after Fukushima.  This project involves researchers from the Finnish Meteorological 
Institute; there are a substantial number of doctoral dissertations from Aalto University and 
some cooperation with a Norwegian research center.
2.1.3  Broad Issues of Risk Analysis
The remaining two projects, both in RG2, analyze broader risks and risk analysis methods: 
GENXFIN and PRAMEA.  GENXFIN is focused on licensing issues and materials challenges 
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with new technologies, including small modular reactor designs, fourth generation light water 
reactors, and fusion designs.  The European Strategic Energy Technology Plan advocates new 
nuclear power technologies as part of de-carbonization, and this was the reason GENXFIN 
was initiated.  GENXFIN is very active with international working groups and other national 
and international networks (e.g., GEN4FIN, OECD/NEA, GIF, NUGENIA, IAEA).  It seeks not 
only to develop technological expertise, but also to nurture new business opportunities for 
Finnish companies in technology transfer, process development, and materials engineering.
PRAMEA is developing extensions of Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) methods that 
would be useful for site-level (multi-unit) accidents (where disturbances in one unit initi-
ate problems in another unit), and useful in general, such as dynamic flowgraph methods 
and better ways to introduce human reliability analysis (HRA) into PRA.  Some of the work 
packages focus on improving the efficiency and usefulness of models that are unsolvable 
with current techniques.  PRAMEA connects to SAUNA around defense-in-depth, EXWE on 
weather conditions and atmospheric releases, and FIRED, FOUND and CASA on analyses of 
fire risks, aging mechanisms and severe accidents. Research on the digital control room and 
human reliability in general could link to operator behavior in the CORE project.  PRAMEA 
has strong cooperation with other Nordic countries.  Because PRA is such a central topic to 
risk analysis and risk communication in the global nuclear power community, it is important 
to maintain competence in Finland.
2.1.4  Overall Evaluation
The seven projects within SG1 fit the SAFIR2018 mission and each has produced results 
that meet expectations for competence, in terms of papers, publications, graduate training, 
national and international networks, and reputation.  However, the collection of projects may 
not constitute a coherent program.  Without a strategic analysis and plan, it is difficult to know 
whether the program is producing the right results. 
2.1.5  Challenges
• The projects in SG1 are particularly challenging because they cover a wide range of dis-
ciplines, from human factors and organizational culture to probabilistic risk analysis.  
Although there is general recognition that safety is more than technical defense-in-depth 
and must include human and organizational behavior, actually achieving valuable conver-
sations and collaborations across diverse disciplines is very difficult.  These disciplines vary 
greatly in how established and convergent are their approaches and methods.  PRA is well-es-
tablished and algorithmic, although still facing challenges of applicability to software, human 
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behavior, system-level interactions, and other accident causes; whereas organizational 
culture is a relatively new field with contested theories and approaches.  These disciplines 
also vary considerably in how much they target nuclear safety.  Although PRA emerged 
from the nuclear power industry, as a risk analysis method it is applied to a wide range of 
risks.  Similarly, human factors, project management, and organizational and safety culture 
research methods and results are applicable to any industry.  Hence, in contrast to other 
parts of the SAFIR2018 program, the projects in SG1 are more generic and therefore raise the 
question of priority within a nuclear safety program.  How important is it for nuclear safety to 
have these capabilities represented in the Finnish nuclear power community?
• This variability among projects generates the related challenge of linking across projects.  
It is not clear which projects need to connect with each other and how best to facilitate 
those interactions.  Although many of the projects in SG1 have connections with each 
other, there is no obvious reason why some projects are together in SG1 rather than in 
another SG.  Similarly, there is no obvious integrity or purpose to RG1 or RG2.  RG1 is fully 
within SG1, yet they represent a diverse group.  The RG2 projects in SG1 have some link-
ages to RG2 projects in SG2 and SG3, and some linkages to some of the RG1 projects, but a 
variety of groupings could be attempted.
• Further, without a clear plan, it is difficult to assess progress against the plan.  How can we 
then evaluate competencies for handling unexpected future challenges?  Our evaluation is 
based on the quality of the work, judged by papers and publications, and on the quality of 
the students and researchers in the next generation whose competence will be needed.  But 
these indicators vary greatly depending on the stage of research, activity in the field (how 
many conferences and journals accept such work?), innovativeness of the approach, availa-
bility of support, and so forth.  Additional indicators would be helpful, such as career paths 
of graduates, citation rates of papers and publications, implementation of ideas in power 
plants with measures of enhanced safety performance, and size and nature of networks.  
Such indicators take years to develop and years to see results to fruition, particularly when 
the work is more innovative and therefore less interpretable with existing indicators.
• The SAFIR program attempts to cover a broad range of topics with modest resources.  
Funding is moderate and the intention of the SAFIR2018 Framework Plan was to keep 
funding constant or increased slightly; however, funding was reduced noticeably from 
2015 to 2016 due to loss of a revenue source.  Projects responded by canceling some work 
packages and otherwise making do with less.  Each project within SG1 funds approxi-
mately 0.5-3 researcher-equivalents per year.  These are modest investments considering 
the number of work packages, range of topics, and results desired.  It is particularly chal-
lenging for those projects that are smaller or more isolated from communities of scholars.
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2.1.6  Recommendations
• The diverse set of projects in SG1 would benefit from a clear strategic plan or roadmap.  
This would help set priorities and determine needs regarding what has to be available 
within Finland in contrast to areas of expertise that can be assembled worldwide as 
needed (as this evaluation team was assembled).  We believe that competence in human 
and organizational behavior is an important aspect of assuring nuclear safety, but needs 
thoughtful support given rapidly-changing scientific knowledge on these topics and the 
scarcity of expertise in Finland and many other countries.
• A stronger strategic plan should include additional guidance about what constitutes 
success.  Current indicators such as numbers of papers, publications, and graduate theses 
are important but a broader range of indicators could be helpful.  
• A stronger strategic plan would also strengthen arguments for additional funding.  Our sense 
is that the SAFIR2018 program is doing a lot with a modest allotment of resources.  Additional 
reductions in funding, such as what happened from 2015-2016, would create serious short-
ages.  Indeed, with a clearer sense of national priorities and gaps in available expertise, 
stronger arguments could be made for increased funding and the value added for stakeholders.
• Finally, the organization of projects into SGs and RGs needs to be reconsidered.  The projects 
in SG1 are a particularly varied assortment.  The need for linkages across projects should be 
assessed.  SGs and RGs could be reorganized to reflect thematic connections.  Or, RG chairs 
could be given more authority to work together and develop creative ways to connect across 
projects.  Consideration should be given to connections both within SAFIR and to the network 
of researchers and end users inside and outside Finland.  These connections are of different 
importance to different projects.  For example, MAPS could benefit from additional interac-
tions within SAFIR (e.g., with CORE) and outside SAFIR (e.g., with the project management 
research community and safety culture research and implementation at IAEA).
2.2  Steering Group 2 Reactor Safety
In accordance with the objectives for SAFIR2018, the eleven projects in the second Steering 
Group (SG2) deal with the development, maintenance and application of infrastructure 
(experimental facilities and numerical tools) in “reactor safety.” They cover the experimental 
and numerical capacity and expertise in the following areas: 
1. Reactor physics 
2. Fuel behaviour 
3. Thermal hydraulics (STH)  
4. Multi-physics and multi-scale code coupling
18
Figure 1 presents the relationship between the eleven projects, which are assigned to three dif-
ferent reference groups (RGs).  
Figure 1: Eleven projects in SG2 and their relationship 
2.2.1  Reactor Physics
Two projects, KATVE and MONSOON, are devoted to the further development and appli-
cation of the Finnish Monte Carlo code SERPENT. Their technical work can be divided into 
three tasks: (1) further improvement of the SERPENT code through the implementation of an 
advanced method for spatial homogenization, (2) application of the SERPENT code to various 
technical fields such as radiation shielding, criticality analysis and material activation, and (3) 
maintenance of the international users’ group. 
The results of both projects made significant contribution to the buildup of infrastructure 
(SERPENT code) and the education of young researchers. It brings the Finnish research group 
to the top position of the international research community. Due to budget limitation, no val-
idation work was performed in SAFIR2018. Furthermore, the wide spectrum of application 
fields hinders in-depth investigation of the individual phenomena. Two specific recommenda-
tions are proposed:
1. The number of the application cases should be properly reduced, to bundle the research 
resources to the cases with high priority. 
2. Validation work should be considered in the future working plan. 
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2.2.2  Thermal-hydraulics
Five projects examine both experimental and numerical topics in thermal-hydraulics. Three 
projects are devoted to numerical tasks:  severe accident analysis (CASA), system thermal-hy-
draulics (STH) analysis (COVA) and computational fluid dynamics (CFD) analysis (NURESA). 
The CASA project considers many phenomena that were given high priority by the interna-
tional research community. Several internationally-accepted and widely-used codes such as 
MELCOR for severe accident progress, MC3D for fuel-coolant interaction and ASTEC for 
containment thermal-hydraulics were selected as reference tools. The main achievements of 
CASA are the training of young experts in the application of the simulation codes and strong 
interaction with the international research community. 
For transient safety analysis, the Finnish STH code Apros has been internationally well-recog-
nized. The main objective of the COVA project is to preserve competence in the development, 
maintenance and application of the Apros code. For this purpose, a large number of validation 
cases (benchmark exercises) was selected, covering both separate effect tests (SET) and inte-
gral effect tests (IET). This project also serves as the central platform for interaction with the 
international research community. However, there seem to be too many selected validation 
cases to be supported by the resources allocated to the project.
NURESA is devoted to CFD codes, including the commercial CFD code Fluent and the open 
source CFD code OpenFOAM. Three results can be highlighted: (1) development of new models 
for two-phase flow and heat transfer, (2) assessment of the CFD simulation with the international 
benchmarking exercises, and (3) successful coupling of the CFD code with the STH code Apros. 
Both experimental projects INSTAB and INTEGRA are focused on the investigation of ther-
mal-hydraulic phenomena with three different large-scale test facilities. The test facility 
PPOOLEX is used for flow and heat transfer behavior in a large water pool under accident con-
ditions. Direct contact condensation (DCC), flow instability, thermal stratification and thermal 
mixing are the main phenomena to be investigated. In addition, experimental data will be used 
for the validation of CFD simulations and for supporting the development of the Effective Heat 
Source (EHS) and Effective Momentum Source (EMS) models, which were proposed by KTH. 
The experiments are making good progress and the results achieved so far fulfill expectations. 
Two test facilities were developed in project INTEGRA. PASI was designed for the inves-
tigation of generic passive safety system performance. The construction of the test facility 
was finished and commissioning is foreseen in 2018. PWR PACTEL is an integral test facil-
ity for PWR safety systems. An integral test facility represents the safety research standard 
of a country, and thus has very high importance for the Finnish nuclear safety community.  
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Experiments were performed to investigate the effect of Nitrogen on the coolability of the 
reactor core under LOCA conditions. The main purpose of the experiment is the production of 
test data for the validation of STH codes such as Apros. 
In general, these five projects fit well the targets of SAFIR2018, especially with respect to the 
buildup of infrastructure (hardware and software), expertise preservation and international 
interaction. The large number of publications indicates the high quality of the results. Two 
specific recommendations are proposed:
1. For each subject one reference code should be defined, so that more effort can be focused 
on the numerical codes with high priority. 
2. Validation activities need to be continued. Tight interaction between the numerical groups 
and the experimental teams would help to produce more adequate experimental data and 
identify more suitable benchmark cases. 
2.2.3  Fuel Behavior
PANCHO focuses on the development and validation of the Finnish code FINIX for the coupled 
analysis of mechanical and thermal behavior of fuel. Emphasis of the project was placed on code 
validation. An automated validation procedure was developed. Validation activities were carried out 
within international benchmark exercises and provided excellent opportunity for training young 
researchers. However, some benchmark cases, e.g., OECD/NEA RIA benchmark case, might not be 
well suited for the validation purpose, because the boundary conditions for the fuel code FINIX were 
provided by other severe accident analysis codes, which are known to have large uncertainties. 
CATFIS investigates experimentally the behavior of fission products. Although it appears not 
to fit the numerical platform of SG2, there is a close technical connection to projects PANCHO 
and CASA. CATFIS investigates the chemistry, phase state and transport of fission products. 
The results could be directly applied to the numerical codes for severe accident analysis and for 
fuel performance analysis. The experimental results of the CATFIS project reveal completely 
new evidence about the phase states (gas or particle) of Iodine and Ruthenium species, have 
strong impact on the source term modeling and have achieved high international recognition. 
Two specific recommendations are proposed:
1. The future validation of the FINIX code should be more concentrated on separate effects 
tests with well-defined boundary conditions. 
2. The results obtained so far in the CATFIS project emphasize the deficiency in the existing 
models. Further efforts need to be made to develop new models for the Iodine transport 
and the source term in the severe accident analysis codes.
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2.2.4  Multi-Physics and Multi-Scale Code Coupling
Multi-physics and multi-scale code coupling is one of the hottest research topics worldwide. 
Two projects investigate code coupling techniques and uncertainty analysis methodology, 
respectively. The SADE project is dedicated to the coupling of CFD code PORFLO with 
neutronic code HEXTRAN and STH code SMABRE. The main purpose of SADE is the develop-
ment of an independent Finnish safety analysis platform. The coupling was successfully built 
and the first validation was carried out.  
USVA focuses on the development and application of uncertainty analysis methodologies. It is 
tightly coupled with the SADE project. Uncertainty and sensitivity analysis was performed for 
several individual numerical codes used in SG2 as well as for the code coupling system. Most 
of the work was carried out within the benchmark exercises organized by the OECD/NEA 
working group LWR-UAM. One of the remaining challenges is modeling uncertainty propaga-
tion in the code coupling system. 
Two specific recommendations are proposed:
1. For the specific code coupling system, investigation should be carried out to compare 
various code coupling methodologies, with respect to their numerical efficiency and 
numerical accuracy.
2. Future efforts should also be made on methodology development for the analysis of uncer-
tainty propagation in code coupling systems. 
2.2.5  Overall Evaluation 
From the technical point of view, good results have been achieved in all four areas and also 
documented in numerous publications. Highlights include: (1) buildup of important research 
infrastructure (hardware and software), some of which have or could become among the ref-
erence facilities or reference tools worldwide; (2) further development of existing numerical 
codes with improved models or methodologies, such as the advanced method of spatial homog-
enization for SERPENT and the new two-phase heat transfer models for CFD codes, and (3) 
production of new experimental data for the validation of numerical tools and for more relia-
ble modeling of individual phenomena involved in accident processes.  
The central goal of the projects in SG2 is the buildup and improvement of test facilities and 
numerical tools for reactor safety research. Major focus was placed on the Finnish homemade 
codes, such as the neutronic code SERPENT, the STH code Apros, the fuel code FINIX and the 
CFD code PORFLO. Construction of the multi-physics and multi-scale code coupling system is 
making good progress. The three test facilities PWR PACTEL, PPOOLEX and PASI would facili-
tate Finnish safety research and maintain its top position in the international community.
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The projects utilize large scale test facilities, a large number of codes covering a wide spectrum 
of subjects and have very active connection to the international community. They are attrac-
tive for young researchers and well suited for their education and training. The research teams 
consist mostly of young researchers. Several PhD theses and a large number of Master theses 
have resulted from the projects. 
International activities are ongoing in all four areas, mainly through participation in interna-
tional working groups and/or benchmark exercises. Two Finnish numerical simulation codes, 
the MC code SERPENT and the STH code Apros, are well established and have attracted large 
international user groups. The test facility PWR PACTEL has a good possibility of becoming 
one of the international reference facilities in reactor safety research. 
2.2.6  Challenges 
• Eight of the eleven projects in SG2 serve to build the Finnish independent software plat-
form for reactor safety analysis and at the same time cover various research areas. Strong 
interaction among the projects would facilitate progress. In SAFIR2018 these eight pro-
jects are distributed in three different reference groups (RGs). As indicated in Figure 1, 
some projects from the same area belong to different RGs. This structure makes smooth 
and tight interaction between the projects difficult.
• The software platform for reactor safety analysis covers various scientific and technical 
topics. Several codes were taken into consideration for each topic. This leads to a large 
number of codes used in the projects and, subsequently, could hinder a deep investigation 
on each individual code.
• One central objective in SG2 is the development of the Finnish multi-physics/multi-scale 
numerical simulation platform. Effective numerical architecture and coupling methodology 
play essential roles and determine to what extent the simulation platform could be applied. 
• Extensive and successful validation is the pre-condition for the quality and reliability of 
numerical codes. Selection of the most suitable validation cases requires, however, com-
prehensive expertise. Furthermore, production of sufficient CFD-grade experimental 
data from the large-scale test facilities with well-defined boundary conditions remains a 
very challenging task.
2.2.7  Recommendations 
• More flexibility should be given to the RGs, so that they can easily organize scientific and 
technical meetings on a multi-RGs basis and enhance interaction among projects.
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• The SAFIR research community should identify the reference codes for each research 
topic. This might improve usage of existing research resources.
• A working group with experienced experts would provide important support to establish a 
phenomena identification and ranking table (PIRT) and to define the future validation cases. 
• More efforts should be made to advertise the test facility PWR PACTEL in the interna-
tional community and to involve international working groups in the definition of the 
future test cases, with the objective that PWR PACTEL becomes one of the international 
reference facilities for reactor safety research. 
• The technical background for all eleven projects is solely focused on light water reactors 
of GEN-II and GEN-III. The strategic plan should extend the application of the existing 
numerical codes to GEN-IV reactors and educate young researchers on next generation 
nuclear power technologies. 
• The strategic plan should include the digital nuclear power plant, which is the future 
development direction of the multi-physics/multi-scale simulation technology and 
extremely well-suited for building infrastructure and expertise.  
2.3  Steering Group 3 Structural Safety and Materials
Projects under the supervision of Steering Group 3 address mainly issues linked with aging, 
condition monitoring and long term operation of nuclear power plants (NPPs), including all 
six projects (COMRADE, FOUND, LOST, MOCCA, THELMA and WANDA) belonging to RG5 
“Structural Integrity.”  The remaining two projects are part of RG2 “Severe Accidents and 
Risk Analysis”: ERNEST deals with external hazards and FIRED with severe accidents. A brief 
description of the projects and their results follows.
2.3.1  Condition Monitoring and Long Term Operation
The effect of radiation, temperature, mechanical loading and chemical environment on the 
nucleation and growth of damage (mainly cracks and corrosion) and on the degradation of 
(mechanical) properties of polymers, carbon steels and stainless steels is investigated experi-
mentally. Models are also developed to further the understanding of the observed phenomena 
and to account for them in safety evaluations.
For polymers used in parts such as seals, COMRADE attempts to establish experimental 
correlations between stressors (radiation, heat, oxidation, stress) and changes in material 
properties and then to relate changes in properties to degradation of part functionality. This 
information serves to develop so-called aging Master Curves and end-of-life criteria to support 
plant maintenance operations. 
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In a set of related synergistic projects, new test methods are developed to characterize the 
fracture resistance of irradiated pressure vessel steels and the aging and stress corrosion 
behavior of stainless steels and dissimilar metal welds. FOUND investigates corrosion fatigue 
and thermal fatigue in BWR internals and piping systems.  It reviews and develops damage and 
failure assessment methods to support risk-informed inspection methods. In a separate task, 
it develops analysis methods for the dynamic structural response of piping systems. 
LOST addresses the structural integrity of NPP components such as reactor pressure vessel 
(RPV), pipes and valves. Fast fracture in the upper shelf temperature regime of RPVs is inves-
tigated and improved methods are developed for fracture toughness measurements and crack 
driving force estimations for dissimilar metal welds (DMW). 
MOCCA investigates the effect of water chemistry on corrosion of the secondary side of steam 
generators in PWR/VVER reactors with the practical goal of mitigating corrosion problems. 
Stainless steels and nickel base alloys are tested with various inhibition strategies for the dep-
osition of magnetite in steam generators. The effect of lead on the corrosion of carbon steels is 
also studied and candidates to replace hydrazine as an oxygen scavenger in PWR are screened. 
THELMA studies the behavior of nuclear materials in light water reactor (LWR) environ-
ments with special focus on the determination of thermal aging and environmentally assisted 
cracking in irradiated austenitic primary circuit materials, i.e., stainless steel weld and cast 
materials and nickel-based Alloy 690. 
WANDA focuses on the development and understanding of non-destructive examination (NDE) 
methods in two important nuclear power plant environments: primary circuit component 
materials (mainly stainless steels) and concrete infrastructure. Research work of primary circuit 
components concentrates on the ultrasonic testing of artificial defects, simulations and prob-
ability of detection (POD). NDE research on concrete infrastructure focuses on the evaluation 
and calibration of the available NDE methods and monitoring systems for concrete structures. 
To that effect, the project focuses on the design and construction of a full-scale reinforced con-
crete wall mock-up for NDE testing method development and education purposes.
2.3.2  External Hazards
ERNEST is a continuation of the ESPIAC project. Its overall goal is to develop and keep up capa-
bilities to predict the response of NPP containment under different types of loadings including 
aircraft impacts, earthquakes, and pressurization. This is achieved by performing dynamic and 
static structural experiments on concrete models, performing numerical simulations of the 
experiments and developing and improving the various model elements entering the simula-
tions until sufficient validation is achieved by comparison with the experimental data.
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2.3.3  Severe Accidents
FIRED aims at evaluating the fire risks of cables during plant life cycle, assessing the perfor-
mance of fire-barriers, and developing, maintaining and validating fire simulation tools. It 
contributes new methodologies for assessing defense-in-depth in the context of fire safety and 
studies and models new fire retardant materials. 
2.3.4  Overall Evaluation
The SG3 projects significantly contribute to and meet the objectives of the SAFIR2018 program, 
in terms of research results, infrastructure development, competence building, and interna-
tional connections. The research performed in the projects under SG3 produces scientifically 
and practically relevant results of good to very good quality, as indicated in particular by the 
number of refereed publications. The projects demonstrate a suitable balance between experi-
mental, modeling and simulation work and between more basic and more applied research.  The 
research results meet in a timely manner the needs of both regulators and operators of NPPs. 
Several important elements of research infrastructure have been developed and are now in use 
in SG3 projects.  Newly developed experimental facilities or methods include:
• Polymer seals test facility (COMRADE)
• Impact test facility for reinforced concrete plates and simple structures (ERNEST and 
predecessors)
• Testbed with built-in generic defects for the development and evaluation of concrete NDE 
methods (WANDA)
• Contributions to the development and validation of the 4 mm–thick CT fracture tough-
ness specimen (LOST)
• Tapered specimen test for investigation of stress corrosion cracking of dissimilar metal 
welds (THELMA)
Progress in the development of simulation and modeling tools include:
• Code to simulate NDE detection of defects and estimate probabilities of detection POD 
(WANDA)
• Impact simulation tools for concrete structures and improved concrete failure models 
(ERNST)
• Coupling of Fire Dynamic Simulator with Reactive Molecular Dynamics Code ReaxFF 
(FIRED)
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The SG3 projects contribute to the education of a significant number of dynamic young 
researchers. The evaluation committee was impressed by their enthusiasm and presentation 
skills.  However, ERNST seems to involve only seasoned researchers and does not contribute 
to any MS or PhD theses.
All the SG3 projects (with the possible exception of MOCCA) are extremely well connected 
on the international scene, being partners in Nordic, European Union or OECD projects. 
Collaboration with Finnish research teams is sought after in the international nuclear materials 
and structures community and several teams play a leading role in international projects. Thus, 
free access to a large body of relevant data and information is secured for Finnish researchers. 
2.3.5  Challenges
Structural safety and materials research faces several challenges:
• Finnish plants present a broad spectrum of designs. In addition, these power plants are 
in different stages of their lives (design, commissioning, operation, life extension). These 
circumstances therefore require a broad range of competences by the regulators and 
operators to run and maintain the various plants. 
• The diversity of designs and suppliers results in a broad range of materials used in the 
plants and for which issues of resistance, aging and degradation must be addressed. This 
materials diversity puts pressure on the research resources required to address materials 
issues.  Diversity also complicates the supply chain and increases costs.
• In this environment, realistic planning and strategic choices must guarantee that 
research resources are not spread too thin, so as to cover the major nuclear safety needs. 
On the other hand, resources must be available for innovative and creative research with 
less direct application to oversight and operation of NPPs.
2.3.6  Recommendations
The review and evaluation of the SG3 projects leads to the following recommendations:
• It is difficult to obtain a comprehensive overview of the various research areas covered 
under SG3, their sometimes ambitious goals and the timeline and resources required to 
achieve these goals. Synergies with other non-SAFIR2018 projects, funded for instance by 
operators or international agencies, are not transparent. We recommend that a road map 
for the SG3 projects be established with short-, mid- and long-term objectives, a time line, 
estimated financial needs and expected financial support besides SAFIR funding. The 
synergies between projects should also be highlighted in realistic terms.
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• Some projects cover an extremely broad spectrum of tasks (e.g. LOST, FOUND). Because 
of limited funding, progress in each task is relatively slow. The topical relationship 
between the various tasks within a project and their interactions are often not obvious. 
On the other hand, similar tasks are performed in different projects. We recommend that 
the number of topics covered in each project be reduced and that similar topics covered in 
two different projects be regrouped in a single project. This reorganization should provide 
for a better thematic focus and more efficient use of resources. It will also foster more 
genuine collaborations between researchers. 
• Researchers and research groups tend to get entrenched in their narrow domains of activ-
ity. To a certain degree, this focus is needed to advance the research. On the other hand, 
it can be detrimental in a complex field such as nuclear safety. VTT may be particularly 
susceptible to silo mentality because it employs predominantly permanent staff. We 
therefore recommend that job rotations be organized at VTT (if they do not already exist), 
where an appropriate number of researchers move from their group to a different group 
to broaden their experience and exposure to technical and scientific subcultures. These 
rotations will also serve to facilitate the dialogue between projects. Top-down action by 
VTT management will probably be required to implement job rotations and the SAFIR 
program could provide some financial incentives to help with this implementation.
• With the trend to extend the life of existing NPP and the associated aging issues, monitor-
ing and inspection of systems and structures gain increased importance. We recommend 
that more projects be dedicated to non-destructive inspection methods to complement 
the good effort accomplished in project WANDA. Directions for new research should be 
guided by the findings in materials aging projects such as THELMA, LOST and FOUND.
• More room should be allotted for innovative and basic research. Such research is neces-
sary to sharpen competences and to attract and motivate young researchers. It is also key 
to solving long-term problems. Areas where a push in this direction seems desirable and 
where more expertise would be welcome are: 1) micromechanical modeling of the mechan-
ical behavior of materials and in particular of DMV and 2) multi-scale multi-physics 
modeling of material aging processes. DMW are very heterogeneous, unisotropic micro-
structures, the mechanical and deformation behavior of which cannot (except in a few very 
specific cases) reliably be apprehended with classical continuum mechanics parameters. 
This limitation is particularly evident for fracture predictions for DMW. Aging phenomena 
invariably involve atomistic processes, which then affect microstructural morphology and 
macroscopic properties. Multi-scale multi-physics modeling will provide a better under-
standing of the aging mechanisms and will allow a significant reduction and an improved 
focus in the experimental effort required for monitoring aging phenomena in NPP.  
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• Project ERNEST should try to look at some of the results of military research on concrete 
penetration. While the information may be difficult to access, a lot of modeling work has been 
performed on the dynamic constitutive and failure response of concrete. Also, using ALE 
codes such as LS-DYNA could provide a valuable alternative to ABAQUS explicit for the sim-
ulation of impact problems, particularly when fragmentation and perforation become issues. 
2.4   Reference Group 6 Research Infrastructure
The SAFIR2018 program has the somewhat remarkable feature that, beyond funding research 
projects, it also provides for funds to develop, build and occasionally maintain unique research 
facilities in Finland, or to access such facilities abroad. Specifically, the program finances three 
infrastructure projects under Reference Group 6 (RG6), INFRAL, RADLAB and JHR, which 
are briefly described and evaluated below.
2.4.1  INFRAL
This project is concerned with the thermal-hydraulic (TH) test facilities at Lappeenranta 
University of Technology (LUT), i.e., the PPOOLEX facility to investigate the suppression pool 
of BWR containments, the PWR-PACTEL to investigate steam generators of PWR, the newly 
constructed PASI test facility to investigate passive heat removal systems and the planned 
MOTEL modular test facility to study a wide range of nuclear power plant designs (VVER, 
PWR, BWR and small modular reactors).  The project develops new advanced measurement 
techniques, including wire-mesh sensors (WMS), particle image velocimetry (PIV) and high 
speed cameras, as well as the associated data reduction and analysis software. It also performs 
the design of the MOTEL facility, and supports the maintenance of the TH test facilities and 
the participation in international collaborations.  The TH test facilities at LUT provide the 
platforms used for INSTAB and INTEGRA.
2.4.2   RADLAB
Special funding in the SAFIR2018 program serves for the construction and equipment of the 
new Centre for Nuclear Safety (CNS) at VTT. The RADLAB project handles the equipment 
and commissioning of the CNS Nuclear Materials Research and Radiochemistry Laboratory 
(NMRRL) and its peripherals. The Laboratory is a state-of-the-art facility for research on radi-
oactive materials (excluding fuels and fuel elements) equipped with six A-class hot-cells with 
manipulators and radioactive material transfer facilities.  The hot-cell equipment includes, 
among others, machines for specimen fabrication and mechanical testing machines for tensile, 
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compressive, Charpy impact and fracture tests. Scanning and transmission electron micro-
scopes with analytical instruments, and equipment for preparation of metallographic samples 
are also available in separate enclosures with controlled environment and radiation. As the 
committee visited the NMRRL, operations had just started.
2.4.3  JHR
Finland is a partner in the Jules Horowitz Reactor (JHR) project, for the design and con-
struction of a new material research reactor at CEA Cadarache, France. The JHR will be an 
international user facility, the operation of which will be similar to that of the Halden Reactor 
Project, with multinational projects and proprietary experiments. The SAFIR2018 project 
is tasked with representing Finland in the three working groups that will be planning the 
experiments in the JHR facility. A previous SAFIR project has designed and fabricated the 
MELODIE test setup (MEchanical LOading Device for In-core Experiments) for irradia-
tion creep testing of Zircaloy 4 fuel cladding tubes under biaxial loading. During the current 
project, preliminary tests of the setup have been performed.
2.4.4  Overall Evaluation
The unique thermal-hydraulic facilities at LUT are remarkable for their size and testing capa-
bilities. As far as we could judge during our visit, they are maintained in excellent functioning 
conditions and regularly updated with new state-of-the-art measurement instrumentation 
for investigating various safety issues in Finnish nuclear power plants. They have proved very 
useful in licensing the new EPR reactor at Olkiluoto 3 and will certainly also do so for the new 
VVER under consideration for construction in Finland.
The CNS - NMRRL infrastructure at VTT is also an extremely valuable, if not unique facility, 
which will afford Finland the possibility of conducting a wide range of investigations on radio-
active materials.  This capability is very important for the country and its operators of nuclear 
facilities, because:
• of the diversity of reactor types in service or planned in Finland,
• of the diversity of metallic alloys used in these reactors,
• several of these reactors are approaching the end of their design life and require life 
extension and aging monitoring programs.
Thus, the CNS - NMRRL will provide nuclear utilities the required state-of-the art facilities to 
address in a timely, efficient and flexible way their (radioactive) material problems. We salute 
the foresight of the Finnish Government and the nuclear stakeholders in initiating this project 
and bringing it to completion.
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Participating in the JHR consortium is essential for Finland and the nuclear utilities for the 
same reasons mentioned above for the CNS. In addition, the JHR project will provide Finnish 
researchers and industries with an opportunity to showcase internationally their strong com-
petencies in the field of nuclear engineering.
2.4.5  Challenges and Recommendations
The work accomplished under RG6 leadership demonstrates that the SAFIR program can suc-
cessfully manage large infrastructure acquisition projects of great significance for the Finnish 
nuclear industry and for nuclear safety. The community must now make good use of the avail-
able infrastructure by planning high payoff experiments and studies that will positively impact 
modeling and simulation efforts in TH and material aging and hence nuclear safety. 
 One concern shared by the evaluation committee is the long-term financing of the maintenance 
and operation of the facilities. The chosen financing model through acquisition of commercial 
projects risks leaving the facilities without sufficient funding, which could lead to their slow deg-
radation because of lack of use and maintenance. On the other hand, should numerous projects 
compete for use of the facilities, the need for financing could result in favoring projects with 
high financial returns but lower technical and scientific value over those with high technical 
and scientific value but lesser financial benefits. The committee realizes that crafting sustaina-
ble funding solutions requires navigating challenging political and administrative constraints.  
Nevertheless, we recommend that the SAFIR program should address this challenge, lest a sig-
nificant investment in first-class facilities fail to achieve its potential.
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3  Implementing SAFIR2014 
Recommendations
An important objective of the SAFIR2018 evaluation is to understand the nature and effec-
tiveness of responses to the recommendations in the SAFIR2014 report.  This exemplifies the 
capabilities of SAFIR to consider feedback from the international nuclear safety community 
and embed new learning into its research program.  We selected five areas from the report for 
further scrutiny, based on our judgment of their importance in the SAFIR2014 report and our 
understanding of the strategic priorities of the SAFIR program, now and in the future: (1) stra-
tegic top-down steering, (2) funding for research infrastructure, (3) generating new expertise, 
(4) introducing new projects, and (5) cross-disciplinary connections.
3.1   Strategic Top-Down Steering
The SAFIR2014 report recommended that additional top-down steering based on broad 
research themes and strategic objectives would complement and strengthen the overall 
structure of the research program, because research projects primarily emerge bottom-up.  
SAFIR2018 research is now divided among three Steering Groups and this appears justified 
based on the different nature of plant, reactor and structural safety research. This top-level 
structure supports top-down steering provided that there is a common understanding of the 
role of the research and the goals to be achieved. The SAFIR program has undergone changes 
in its funding mechanisms and steering structure throughout its history, while maintaining 
clear consensus on the top-level goal of conducting national research that generates capabili-
ties to tackle challenging safety questions.  However, we observed that different stakeholders 
place somewhat different expectations for the immediate future and the projects to be carried 
out. For example, it is natural that power companies want research results that can improve 
operations in the near term, whereas building capabilities for an uncertain future involves 
balancing many diverse needs, near term and long term, well-known and imagined.  Diverse 
projects can contribute in different ways.  It is important for the SAFIR program to sharpen 
and articulate its goals, create strong stakeholder ownership within each main research area, 
and rethink ways to steer individual projects. In this respect, the top-down steering recom-
mendation of the previous evaluation remains valid and not yet fulfilled. 
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3.2  Funding for Infrastructure
In parallel with the three main research areas of the SAFIR program, a substantial investment 
has been made in the research capabilities of VTT, including the RADLAB facility, and the LUT 
thermal-hydraulic laboratories. The SAFIR2014 report had called for a review of all research 
infrastructure to reach a sustainable basis.  These two facilities now provide physical facilities 
and support for reactor and structural safety research (SG2 and SG3), although it is not yet 
clear how these facilities will be used.  For the next program, a wider view of infrastructure 
should include these reactor and structural safety topics that are specific to nuclear power but 
also recognizing that plant safety (SG1) involves more generic, non-nuclear expertise (e.g., 
human factors, automation) and less obvious nuclear infrastructure needs. Infrastructure 
issues continue to be important and an updated analysis and plan is needed for the next SAFIR 
program to make the best use of the new facilities. This exercise should be based on a transpar-
ent road map covering both the national research needs and a realistic view on utilization of 
the infrastructure by the Finnish and international customers. 
3.3  Generating New Expertise
A research program of diverse projects is managed based on plans and reports. The most 
appreciated feature of the SAFIR program is, however, the generation of new experts. This 
human aspect forms quite a different dimension and it is undoubtedly embedded in all the 
background work conducted to come up with new project ideas and funding decisions. This 
becomes evident when looking at the long-term progress of the SAFIR program in generating 
new expertise and when listening to the new researchers tackling questions of high relevance 
to the end users of a specific Reference Group. The associated recommendation of the previous 
evaluation could be transformed to an even stronger wish for promoting activities that would 
truly accelerate development in areas where there is a high need for new understanding, either 
within the Finnish nuclear research domain or by international networking. The best results 
are achieved when stakeholders and researchers are enthusiastic, together.
3.4   Introducing New Projects
Flexibility to respond to a rapidly-changing operating environment really means finding a 
balance between on-going research projects that need continuing funding and new projects 
that are responding to emerging needs and emerging ideas.  The SAFIR program issues a call 
for proposals every year, and projects are funded annually.  However, in practice, projects actu-
ally need funds for multiple years and the expectation is that funds will be renewed as long as 
the research is making appropriate progress.  It is not easy for the Managing Board to balance 
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stability of research funding and opportunities for new proposals within a limited budget. It 
is natural that established research teams with proven productivity are in a good position to 
receive continued funding for the same or related projects.  The proper balance may also differ 
between the research areas. The MB has used a small fund (50K Euros yearly) to selectively 
fund new projects, but this is a modest step.  The need for more flexibility remains as expressed 
by the previous evaluation report and we have some suggestions for ways to accomplish this 
goal in the next SAFIR with a stepwise increase in funds reserved for new projects carrying a 
high end-user value within the mission of the SAFIR program.
3.5  Cross-Disciplinary Connections
Finally, the SAFIR2014 report emphasized the growing complexity of nuclear safety related 
issues and the attendant need for cross-project and cross-disciplinary communication and 
cooperation.  The restructuring of program management from nine Research Groups into 6 
Reference Groups and 3 Steering Groups was intended, in part, to create a matrix structure 
that would offer more opportunities for cross-project interaction.  However, it seems that this 
structure is only partially implemented and is not working fully to facilitate the desired inter-
actions. The SG structure is operating primarily as a project monitoring process.  Only RG2 
is really matrixed across SGs.  The RG structure seems best-suited to creating linkages across 
projects but the RGs function differently from one another.  What has worked best for con-
necting projects is when the same researcher is spending time on two projects, creating a link.  
But this is neither planned nor strategic. The bureaucratic functions of project management 
should take as little time as possible, whereas the work of connecting projects and seeking syn-
ergies should take precedence, ideally when there is a purpose for such connections.  Hence, 
we believe the ideas of the SAFIR2014 report are still valid and not fully realized, and we have 
some ideas for ways forward.
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4  Observations and Challenges
During our evaluation process, we worked to distill our thoughts into a small number of key 
observations and challenges.   More detailed observations associated with individual projects 
were presented earlier.  In this section we capture the broader, more strategic issues that cut 
across the SAFIR2018 program.
4.1  SAFIR2018 Project Results
Overall, our evaluation of the scientific and technical quality of the program is very good.  As 
described in the previous sections, individual research projects are producing results that 
range from good to very good.  End users and stakeholders in general are pleased with the 
program, although some mention opportunities for improvement.  Engagement of the power 
companies and regulator is good and their participation facilitates the relevance and success of 
the research program.  The infrastructure projects are coming to fruition and are an important 
investment in future capabilities. 
4.2  Capabilities
The capabilities supported by the SAFIR2018 program are strong for a country of Finland’s 
size, as demonstrated by the significant numbers of graduate theses, conference presentations, 
scholarly publications, and extensive international cooperation.  These capabilities reside in 
the knowledge documented in reports and publications, the physical infrastructure of labo-
ratories, tools, and models (both physical and computer-based), and most importantly in the 
people whose expertise prepares them to deal with both expected and unexpected develop-
ments.  Most encouragingly, we met many young researchers presenting their work who are 
articulate, energetic, and excited about their research projects and career opportunities. 
It is notable that human experts circulate throughout the nuclear power “ecology” or network 
of organizations, from universities to VTT to STUK to power companies.  This network con-
nects power companies, research organizations, universities, and government within Finland, 
but also reaches out to link Finland with cooperating organizations in other Nordic countries, 
Europe, and the broad global community.  VTT has a special role to play as a training experi-
ence and a center of competence that builds capabilities for the entire network.  The SAFIR 
program is perhaps the most important research budget within VTT.  As a small country, 
Finland has by necessity invested selectively in capability development.  The SAFIR program 
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helps ensure that strategically important areas are represented with sufficient expertise, com-
plementing the roles of universities, power companies, and regulators.
4.3  Organizing a Diverse Project Portfolio
The SAFIR2018 research projects are very diverse in size, technical content, time frame 
for completion, focus on short-term vs. long-term benefits, and nuclear-specific vs. generic 
content.  Reference Groups, not surprisingly, also vary along many of the same dimensions, 
although also differing in how heterogeneous is the set of projects within each RG.  RG3, RG4, 
and RG5 tend to group together projects that are more similar to each other, involving shared 
facilities, tools, methods, and personnel, in contract to RG1 and RG2 that differ greatly in 
topics, scientific disciplines, and project scope.  
4.4  Resources
The SAFIR program attempts to cover a great range of topics with modest resources.  Funding 
is moderate and the intention of the SAFIR2018 Framework Plan was to keep funding con-
stant or to increase slightly; however, funding was reduced noticeably (from 8.2M Euros to 
6.6M Euros) between 2015 and 2016 due to loss of a revenue source.  Projects responded by 
canceling some work packages and otherwise making do with less, and coping with difficult 
trade-offs in prioritizing limited resources.  There were hints of competition for resources 
across projects, although this did not seem widespread or serious. SAFIR only provides 70% 
funding for each project and expects a 30% contribution from the research organization.  
SAFIR projects are only part of the total portfolio of nuclear safety research.  SAFIR projects 
are open to public scrutiny, with results expected to be communicated broadly to the scientific 
and nuclear communities.  Power companies with specific near-term needs and proprietary 
knowledge are likely to commission research separately, possibly from the same research 
organizations that receive SAFIR funds.  Those with projects requiring international coopera-
tion may find that the SAFIR process does not synchronize with the timing and requirements 
of other programs, such as EURATOM. SAFIR funds are given one year at a time, whereas 
EURATOM gives multi-year funding.
4.5  Cross-Disciplinary Connections
For a variety of reasons, interconnections across projects are hard to make.  Everyone is very 
busy.  The focus is on getting the work done, communicating results, and planning future 
research.  Cross-disciplinary conversations that might spark synergistic new ideas can seem 
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like a luxury or a risky investment in future research.  The Reference Group structure was 
intended, in part, to facilitate such interactions, but this is not happening consistently.  Some 
RGs have experienced leaders who are providing broad perspective and nurturing younger 
researchers, but others are just making sure work gets done.
4.6  Starting New Projects
Not surprisingly, given some of the challenges already mentioned, new projects are difficult to 
initiate and there is some sense of inertia in the SAFIR program.  Existing research teams have 
an advantage of being funded already, their work appreciated by those who recommend and 
authorize funding.  The danger is that new researchers will not submit proposals for innova-
tive projects because they worry about the risks of investing in a proposal preparation process, 
only to be rejected. Those with new ideas also may find themselves off-cycle with the four-year 
SAFIR program – entering in the middle of a cycle is even more difficult since most of the pro-
jects are expected to receive continuation funding, leaving little for new projects.  
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5  Opportunities and Suggestions
5.1  Sample SWOT Analysis (Strengths, Weaknesses, 
Opportunities, Threats)
One typical exercise to encourage strategic thinking is to assess strengths, weaknesses, oppor-
tunities, and threats, known as a SWOT analysis.  As an example, we offer the beginnings of 
such an analysis.
It is evident that the SAFIR2018 program is doing a good job nurturing expertise, which is the 
primary goal it was established to meet. There are young people studying topics relevant to 
nuclear safety, receiving graduate degrees, conducting research, moving into the network of 
organizations in the nuclear power industry, and so forth.  Various indicators of expertise, such 
as presentations, publications, international conference participation, the perceived compe-
tence of Finnish operations and research, etc. are strongly positive.  Of course, more could be 
done, but this is a current strength.
We also believe that there is less cross-disciplinary interaction and cooperation within the 
SAFIR2018 program than desired in a research activity.  The separated silos of researchers 
were a topic of concern for the SAFIR2014 evaluation and an inspiration for reorganizing 
Research Groups into SGs and RGs.  However, for the most part the silos remain as a weakness.
There is a significant opportunity to inject new research proposals into the SAFIR program.  
We believe there are other researchers and other topics, including cross-discipline topics and 
those with international links, that could be introduced into SAFIR.  Because resources are 
limited and there are strong expectations of continuity, there is an opportunity for balanced 
renewal that sustains existing projects while creating space for new ideas and new researchers.
Finally, the threat if nothing changes is slow stagnation.  If we take seriously that the goal of 
SAFIR is to build competence to prepare for an uncertain future, then a funding process that 
supports incremental advances and research-as-usual will not be able to keep up with the need 
for a fresh and exciting set of projects.  There will not be any obvious signals that anything is 
wrong with SAFIR, but when new competence is needed in the future, we want to make sure it 
is available.  The cost of more novelty, flexibility, and exploration is that some results will not 
be useful immediately or ever, but the competence developed through these projects will be 
valuable beyond any specific results.
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5.2  Develop a Roadmap/Evaluate Capabilities Against 
Needs
We agree with the SAFIR2014 evaluation report that more can be done to provide a strategic 
view of the SAFIR research portfolio and additional top-down “steering” of priorities.  We 
heard that the Managing Board attempted to do this but found it too complex for the available 
time and resources, and then left the task to the Steering Groups, who had no better success.  
This is not an easy task but we believe it is important to bring together both stakeholder 
representatives and the best information available about scenarios for the future of nuclear 
power in Finland.  This can help define the breadth and depth of expertise needed within the 
country, what is available currently in terms of scientific knowledge, tools, and infrastructures 
(laboratories, simulators, support) and what is in the pipeline of research projects and human 
resources (e.g., students).  The roadmap should include not only SAFIR, but also the connec-
tions to other projects and programs in Finland and through international collaborations.  The 
roadmap should extend beyond the four-year funding cycle but be updated as needed.  Then 
the SAFIR program can be evaluated for its role in supporting necessary capabilities, filling 
gaps, and experimenting with future possibilities.  We do not believe that this roadmap can be 
outsourced to a consulting company or research project but that stakeholder representatives 
must take ownership and then partner with others (e.g., a facilitator) to provide necessary 
expertise and resources to develop the roadmap.  
Then, the roadmap has to be used to facilitate strategic conversations as part of the standard 
process of evaluating projects and programs, planning new programs and generating propos-
als, structuring the governance and organization of programs through SGs and RGs (see the 
following section about flexible organizing), building communities of researchers, and modify-
ing the roadmap as the nuclear power industry evolves.  In order for it to be used, stakeholders 
must understand it as a shared roadmap, adequately capturing their thoughts and needs, that 
facilitates achieving their individual interests and the common goals of building and sustain-
ing necessary competence in Finland. 
5.3  Consider Flexible Funding to Support More  
New Initiatives
There is a sense of stability to the SAFIR program that carries with it some inertia and bar-
riers to entry that are inconsistent with the goal of being prepared for an unexpected future.  
It would be helpful to have more openness to new ideas, accessibility for new researchers, 
and options for funding that would encourage new projects and collaborations within and 
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outside Finland.  The annual funding process is not suitable for all projects.  It creates paper-
work requirements for annual assessments and proposals, while in practice most projects are 
renewed for the four years of a SAFIR plan.  It also creates risks for projects that need guaran-
tees of longer funding and challenges for coordinating with other sources of funding, such as 
EURATOM, that expect to give funding for multiple years.  
We believe that new projects and new teams could be encouraged by having a separate proposal 
category and budget for development of new ideas.  For example, 20% of the annual funding 
could be available for new proposals, innovative and disruptive ideas, funding cycles different 
from one year or four years, and cross-discipline projects.  But it is probably not sufficient just 
to make money available; new proposals and new projects need a supportive organization to 
nurture their development.  For example, such projects could have their own Reference Group 
to provide advice, organize workshops and other developmental activities.  When new projects 
mature, they could be moved into a different RG that would provide a good community. 
5.4  Consider More Flexible Organizing to Build  
a Vibrant Research Community
The structure of SGs and RGs, developed partly in response to recommendations from the 
SAFIR2014 evaluation report intended to increase cross-project interaction and decrease 
unnecessary bureaucratic meetings, has not succeeded fully.  Cross-project interaction is 
happening to some extent, but not as much as hoped.  Considerable meeting time seems to be 
devoted to project monitoring, leaving much less time for meaningful conversations.  
There are opportunities to build more flexibility into the SAFIR organization.  RG heads could 
be given more encouragement to promote interactions among projects in different ways.  
Various kinds of workshops, conferences, and discussions with end users could encourage 
interactions across projects and among various stakeholders.  RG heads could work together 
to share good practices and organize events within RGs and across RGs.  Newsletters and 
blogs could help keep projects aware of progress and opportunities for synergy.  Job rotation 
programs within organizations and externally (such as visits and sabbaticals) could develop 
synergies and expand networks.  Since SAFIR projects are by definition public projects, there 
are additional opportunities to link to other research in Finland and elsewhere to strengthen 
the SAFIR community by considering both the internal SAFIR network and the external, 
extended network of researchers and other stakeholders.  An important capability of Finnish 
expertise is to act as a gateway to anticipate and sense emerging issues and then assemble 
expertise for application to issues that affect nuclear safety in Finland.
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We recognize that everyone is very busy, and that activities added on top of existing work are 
likely to be perceived as a burden.  It is important therefore to remove activities that are not 
adding value.  Perhaps it is not necessary for every project to report on the same schedule, 
depending on project size, maturity, and other features.  Perhaps the SAFIR2018 project 
manager could develop a simplified project management process that would not take as much 
of the SG (and RG) meeting time, leaving time for the SGs to discuss strategic issues and the 
RGs to consider substantive research questions.  
5.5  Develop Ways to Assess Impact
The SAFIR program is intended to generate capabilities to address unexpected future issues of 
nuclear safety.  It is not obvious how to assess whether the results of SAFIR programs are suc-
ceeding in the long term, although it is possible to assess short-term results in terms of papers 
published, reports issued, conferences attended, and degrees conferred.  It is also possible to 
examine the satisfaction of end users (power companies, STUK).  With a stronger roadmap, 
as recommended above, it would be possible to compare SAFIR results against the strategic 
needs as represented in the roadmap.  This would also assist in the evaluation process such 
as this report, by providing more structure.  We believe there are other indicators of SAFIR 
success and impact, including examining the career paths of SAFIR researchers and their 
impact on research, implementation, and policy, and examining the networks of co-authorship 
and professional relationships that constitute the “invisible college” of research communities.
5.6  Think of Organizational Change as a Collaborative 
Opportunity
Some of our most important recommendations are organizational rather than technical.  
Technical recommendations are typically more straightforward to implement: solutions are 
available, expertise is acknowledged, and the difficulties are mostly around complexity and 
resources.  Organizational recommendations are more difficult because solutions have to be 
invented, expertise is less available or recognizable, people have to change their roles, respon-
sibilities, behaviors and beliefs, and stakeholders must find ways to fulfill diverse interests that 
sometimes seem to be in conflict.  Note that some of the SAFIR2014 Evaluation Team recom-
mendations were not fully implemented and have re-emerged as challenges.
The recommendations we advance are not recipes for change, but rather opportunities for 
stakeholders to open new conversations and work together to find effective paths forward on 
their collaborative journey.  The idea of developing a strategic road map, for example, is both a 
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means to articulate strategic goals and guide planning, and also a process for engaging stake-
holders in conversations to achieve greater mutual understanding, assemble innovative ideas, 
and commit to collective goals and actions.  If the road map were to be provided by an external 
consultant, regardless of its strategic value, it would not achieve the level of shared ownership 
that is necessary for successful implementation of organizational change.  Similarly, conduct-
ing a SWOT analysis or designing ways to encourage new proposals and cross-disciplinary 
interactions are both means to identify good ideas but also opportunities to engage stake-
holders and colleagues in a process that can build shared understanding and commitment to 
action.
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6  Conclusions
The SAFIR2018 program is strong.  Results contribute knowledge and expertise needed for 
the Finnish regulator, universities, and power companies to assess new challenges to nuclear 
safety.  New infrastructure provides essential capabilities.  Stakeholders are engaged and gen-
erally pleased with the value they receive.  The next generation of nuclear safety researchers is 
developing and contributing.  Finland has an excellent international reputation and a strong 
network of communication and cooperation with Nordic, European, and global counterparts.
However, there are significant challenges and opportunities for improvement. Like virtually all 
organizations, the SAFIR program faces challenges of leveraging limited resources, attending to 
multiple stakeholders with diverse interests, balancing stability and deepening of existing capabil-
ities with openness to new and disruptive ideas, managing cross-disciplinary connections to derive 
synergies from individual projects, and minimizing administrative burden.  These challenges are 
neither new nor surprising, but addressing them is not easy.  The SAFIR2014 Evaluation Report 
made many similar observations; the recommendations of that report have not been fully imple-
mented.  We have offered our ideas for creating new opportunities and making the most of limited 
resources.  Any improvements, no matter how well designed, will succeed only if stakeholders 
believe in the necessary changes and commit their support.  The road map recommendation is not 
simply about producing a shared plan, but also represents an opportunity to engage stakeholders in 
the process of sharing ideas and envisioning the future of nuclear safety research in Finland.
Table 1:  Steering Groups (SGs) and Reference Groups (RGs)
SG1 
Plant safety and 
systems engineering
SG2 
Reactor safety
SG3 
Structural safety 
and materials
RG1 
Automation, 
organization, & 
human factors
CORE 
MAPS (People) 
SAUNA (I&C) 
ESSI (Electrical)
RG2 
Severe acci-
dents & risk 
analysis
EXWE (Weather)
GENXFIN (New 
reactor designs)
PRAMEA (PRA)
CASA (Thermal- 
hydraulics)
CATFIS (Fuel)
ERNEST  
(Concrete)
FIRED (Fires)
RG3 
Reactor & fuel
KATVE, 
MONSOON  
(Reactor physics)
PANCHO (Fuel)
SADE, USVA  
(Code coupling)
RG4 
Thermal hy-
draulics
COVA, INSTAB,
INTEGRA,  
NURESA (Thermal- 
hydraulics)
RG5 
Structural 
integrity
COMRADE, 
FOUND, LOST,
MOCCA, THELMA, 
WANDA (Condition 
monitoring)
RG6 
Research  
infrastructure
INFRAL (LUT)
RADLAB (VTT)
JHR (CEA)
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